Alaska Employment Law

9th Cir: DWI is not crime of moral turpitude, but DWI without a license is 

Some statutes and many employee handbooks provide that conviction of a crime of “moral turpitude,”or even simply an act of “moral turpitude,” is grounds for dismissal.   In Alaska, for instance, a school district may non-retain a tenured teacher because of ”immorality, which is defined as the commission of an act that, under the laws of the state, constitutes a crime invovling moral turpitude.”  AS 14.20.175(b)(2).  For many licensed professions, commission of such an act or conviction for such is also grounds for license denial or revocation.  This is true in Alaska for real estate brokers and appraisers, hunting guides, pharmacists, and others.  For attorneys, “moral turpitude” had been  grounds for discipline under DR 1-102(A)(3), but has been replaced by a narrower definition in RPC § 8.4 (see Comment).

The 9th Circuit has now construed the phrase “moral turpitude” as used in the part of the Immigration and Naturalization Act that authorizes deportation of any alien recently “convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.”   8 USC § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 

The Court of Appeals held  that driving while intoxicated does not display moral turpitude, but that driving while intoxicated and without a license does involve moral turpitude.

Driving while intoxicated is despicable, and when coupled with the knowledge that one has been specifically forbidden to drive, it becomes ‘an act of baseness, violence or depravity in the private and social duties which a [person] shows to [a] fellowman or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty.’ [Citations omitted.]  The crime reflects a willful disregard for the law and a reckless indifference to the safety of others.

Marmolejo-Campos v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 2610788 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 2007).

In Alaska, the Supreme Court has held that theft and sex with a minor are crimes of moral turpitude justifying license revocation or employment dismissal.  The Court has also held that the employer or licensing body need not show that the immoral act interfered with the person’s ability to perform professional duties. 

[Kenai Peninsula Bor. Bd. of Education v. Brown, 691 P.2d 1034 (Alaska 1984),] held that a finding that a crime of moral turpitude has been committed raises at least a presumption that there is a nexus between a professional’s act and his fitness to practice his profession. Fitness to practice a regulated profession demands more than the professional’s capacity to perfunctorily complete required activities. The board’s finding that Wendte’s crime was not directly related to his professional activities does not rebut Brown ’s presumption that there is a nexus between a crime of moral turpitude and one’s fitness to hold a professional license.

Wendte v. State, Board of Real Estate Appraisers, 70 P.3d 1089, 1093 (Alaska 2003)(emph. in orig.).

UPDATE: The 9th Circuit’s en banc opinion in U. S. v. Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 23007 WL 2713211 (Sept. 19, 2007),  contains examples of crimes that are not categorically crimes of moral turpitude (includig burglarly and assault with a deadly weapon).  Whether Alaska licensing authorities would apply the federal practice (at least with regard to  immigration matters) of looking at the elements of the crime, and not the conduct of the particular criminal) is an open question.