Alaska Employment Law

In an average week, one or two opinions from the District of Alaska appear on Westlaw.  Westlaw’s selection criteria are a bit of a mystery.

Today, for instance, Westlaw published Judge Sedwick’s Order From Chambers in U. S. v. Spencer, 2007 WL 4166230 (D.Alaska Nov. 20, 2007), in which he rejected a pro se criminal defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment because of some aspect of admiralty law.  Sedwick quickly concluded that he saw no merit in what is obviously a crank claim, though, as he often does, he included a bit of humor.*  The Order seems to have little precedential value.

Westlaw sometimes publishes orders without any suggestion or direction by the author that it do so.  That happened with Judge Beistline’s order in Kubanyi v. GVEA, 2007 WL 3002070 (D.Alaska Oct. 12, 2007), where Beistline simply denied a Daubert motion to exclude a surveyor’s report.

Judges obviously can influence Westlaw’s decision to publish.  Parties may even have some role.  AEL will present more on publication criteria in the District of Alaska in a forthcoming post.

* Sedwick said:

In his motion at docket 50, Mr. Spencer describes himself with a flourish as “a Living Man, Real Party in Interest Under Injury (“Creditor”), appearing by restricted and not general appearance in specific and sole capacity as creditor to the Defendant and Case No. 1:07 CR 00005 JWS (“Case”) and through Private Discharging and Indemnity Bond, DTB-1052007-RLS-1 through 3rd Party Plaintiff and legal fiction Rollin Lee Spencer….”  In fact, Mr. Spencer is a defendant in a criminal case brought against him by the United States. The charges are not based on a bond, and have nothing to do with debtors and creditors. An examination of the statutes upon which the charges are based, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), makes that clear.

The motion asks the court to suppress “all evidence” arising from Spencer’s arrest and interrogation and the search of “Greg Garrison’s floating structure.”  It appears that the major premise underlying the motion is Mr. Spencer’s contention that the case at bar is actually a case in admiralty. From this premise, he reasons that all the evidence must be suppressed.

(Footnotes omitted.)