Alaska Employment Law

Jason Bresser worked as an independent contractor at Schlumberger’s Prudhoe Bay motor shop.  Given his classification, Schlumberger did not permit Bresser to participate in its retirement and health benefits plans.  In 2005, Schlumberger terminated his employment.  In this litigation, Bresser challenged his classification and contended Schlumberger suspended and then fired him in retaliation for “having brought problems of tool design and maintenance, and corporate waste, to the attention of defendant’s managers.”  Bresser sued for breach of the good faith covenant, defamation, breach of contract as to wages and benefits, and violations of public policy.  Judge Timothy Burgess has now dismissed all of his claims.

ERISA preemption: Burgess held that ERISA preempted Bresser’s contract and public policy claims that Schlumberger improperly classified him as an independent contractor, and that Bresser had failed to exhaust the internal ERISA plan remedies.  

Good faith covenant claim:  On Bresser’s claim that Schlumberger had violated the “subjective” branch of the covenant theory, Burgess held that Schlumberger showed that Bresser had not engaged in any “protected activity,” i.e., that it had not “retaliated” against him.   Schlumberger did have an express policy of “encouraging a culture of openness and continuous improvement.”  (Fn. 32)  Nonetheless, Burgess held:

Bresser has not asserted that his conduct is protected by statute, common law, or the Alaska constitution.  Nor has he asserted that Schlumberger’s indefinite suspension of him violated a particular public policy.  In particular, he has not alleged that his reporting of the errant equipment diagnoses raised safety concerns.  Rather, he suggests only that the mistakes cost the company money and that, in his view, those costs should have been absorbed by Schlumberger’s clients.  Given this, the Court finds that the conduct alleged by Bresser is qualitatively different from the actionable claims previously recognized by Alaska courts.  Bresser’s allegations may raise questions of corporate management but do not “strike at the heart of a citizen’s social rights, duties and responsibilities.”

Burgess also held that Schlumberger did not violate the “objective” branch of the covenant theory, even if it terminated him for notifying it of cost issues.

Bresser has not alleged disparate treatment or that his dismissal was based on an unconstitutional ground, nor has he suggested that it violated a public policy.  Given the at-will nature of Bresser’s employment with Schlumberger, the Court cannot declare that Schlumberger’s desire to curtail Bresser’s contact with corporate executives was an impermissible motive.  Our conclusion is bolstered by the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in Era Aviation v. Seekins, in which the court held that termination of an at-will employee, even if based on a personality conflict, rather than poor job performance, did not violate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because firing an employee based on a personality conflict was not an improper or impermissible basis for termination.  While dismissing an at-will employee or independent contractor for reporting problems in diagnosing equipment failures may make little sense from a management perspective, it does not, under the circumstances of this case, violate the implied covenant.

Bresser v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 3:05-cv-00246-TMB (Order of Dec. 13, 2007)((Docket # 44).

Joe Josephson of Anchorage represented Bresser.  Tom Daniel of Perkins Coie in Anchorage represented Schlumberger.