Alaska Employment Law

Introduction

The United States Supreme Court issued a new opinion last Tuesday addressing evidentiary standards in employment discrimination cases, Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn. This summary briefly reviews the case and its significance.

The Case

Mendelsohn filed an age discrimination claim after she was laid off during a reduction in force. She sought to introduce evidence that other employees had also experienced age discrimination. However, these other employees had little or nothing in common with her claim. In particular, they had worked for different supervisors and there were no common decision-makers.

The district court excluded this evidence of “me too” employees because the employees in question had not been discriminated against by the same supervisor. The Tenth Circuit reversed on 2-1 split. The majority concluded that the evidence had some probative value because it could conceivably reflect a company-wide pattern of discrimination. The dissent objected that the district court’s ruling was no different than any other evidentiary ruling reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and although different judges could have reached different conclusions on the admissibility of the proffered evidence, no one could categorically state that the district court abused its discretion. The dissent further disagreed with the majority by observing that the proffered evidence concerned only five other employees, scarcely evidence of a company-wide pattern of discrimination given Sprint’s size, and that the actual evidence being offered was generalized and non-specific.

United States Supreme Court’s Opinion

In a remarkably brief and unanimous opinion, the Court vacated (reversed) and remanded the case. The Court held that the Tenth Circuit failed to give adequate deference to the district court’s ruling, and further that the Tenth Circuit misconstrued the nature of Sprint’s argument. Sprint had not argued that such evidence could never be admissible under any circumstances; only that it was not admissible under the facts and circumstances of this particular case. The Court criticized the Tenth Circuit for applying a per se rule by which such “me too” evidence would always be admitted. Instead of applying per se rules admitting or excluding evidence, the Court emphasized that evidentiary rulings were vested in the trial judge’s discretion and should be tailored to the facts and circumstances unique to each case. However, the Court was concerned that the district court’s somewhat cursory ruling did not afford an adequate basis to ascertain how the trial judge determined that the particular form of evidence was inadmissible. Therefore, the Court remanded for the district court to more particularly explain its analysis.

Instead of laying down any firm guidance, the Court more or less punted this case back to the lower courts. In my annual United States Supreme Court forecast issued last October, I predicted as follows:

This forecast was correct in that the Court criticized the Tenth Circuit for not giving the district court’s ruling adequate deference, emphasized that per se rules by which evidence would always be admissible or inadmissible are disfavored, and instructed that each evidentiary ruling should be tailored to the facts and circumstances unique to each case. The fact that the Court sent the case back for further analysis and explanation by the district court should not be surprising, in context, because the essential teaching of the Court’s opinion is that evidentiary rulings resist “black and white” per se rules, and what might be admissible in one case might be inadmissible in another case. That fundamental principle should remain undisturbed no matter what happens once the case is returned to the district court’s docket.

Another important lesson to take from this opinion is that “me too” evidence (testimony from non-parties that they had also been discriminated against by the employer, even if by different supervisors or managers) could possibly be admitted against an employer in some cases. Consequently, employers should take particular care to be sure they have company-wide EEO policies in place and that they have all of their supervisors and managers trained in EEO procedures.

This legal summary is for informational purposes and is not intended as legal advice. Employers with questions or seeking additional information should confer with counsel.

^{Mr. Fisher practices law with Birch, Horton, Bittner and Cherot, 1127 West 7th Avenue, Anchorage, Alaska 99501; (907) 276-1550; gfisher@bhb.com. J.D., University of Washington School of Law (1991), Washington Law Review; B.A. with honors, Harpur College, S.U.N.Y. Binghamton (1988).}