Alaska Employment Law

Judge Timothy Burgess has denied part of the defendant employer’s reconsideration motion in this Title VII action alleging age, race, and parental status discrimination.  The pro se plaintiff seems to be doing a good job of keeping the race part of her case alive.  Judge Burgess earlier denied the employer’s summary judgment motion, and addressed the citation standards for reconsideration motions.

In this reconsideration ruling, Burgess held as follows:

1)  Plaintiff’s agreement (in deposition, apparently) that the firing official was not a “racist” doesn’t preclude her from arguing that her termination was racially motivated.  “This testimony, however, appears to be a matter of semantics - the word “racist” being quite strong and derogatory . . ..”

2)  To the extent that Odima v. Westin Tucson Hotel Co., 991 F.2d 600 (9th Cir. 1993), held that “a finding that one proffered reason was pretextual does not in itself support a finding of discrimination,” it was undercut by the later holding of the Supreme Court in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), that an employer may still be liable under Title VII when the employer had mixed motives for its conduct, some of which are shown to be pretextual. 

3)  Plaintiff’s reliance on the employer’s promise to “channel all communication [from her about age and parental status discrimination] to and through the [EEOC] with respect to this matter until final resolution” did not satisfy her statutory duty to exhaust administrative remedies.

Green v. Brown Shoe Company, d/b/a Famous Footwear, 3:06-cv-00204-TMB (D.Alaska Order of April 1, 2008)

Plaintiff Green is pro se.  Parry Grover and Ted Wellman of Davis Wright in Anchorage represent the employer defendant.