Alaska Employment Law

In an opinion that rings twice with literary allusions, the 9th Circuit this morning held that a California County that removed to federal court could still challenge a District Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the union’s motion to compel.  It held that the non-waivability of jurisdictional challenges trumps the rule of judicial estoppel.  “Put another way, the County may be guilty of chutzpah, but we must consider the merits of its argument anyway.” 

Judge Sydney Thomas wrote for the unanimous panel:

James M. Cain, whose novels were often adapted into film noir, described his body of work by saying “I write of the wish that comes true—for some reason, a terrifying concept.”  The plight of Plumas County would have doubtless piqued his interest. 

Plumas County thought that federal court would provide a more hospitable forum for its defense against a suit seeking to compel arbitration, so it removed the action to federal court. The district court ordered Plumas County to arbitrate.  Now, the County argues that the district court had no business deciding the question because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case that the County removed. We conclude that Plumas was not barred from raising the jurisdictional argument and that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We remand to the district court the question of whether attorneys fees should be assessed.

On the merits, the panel held that the county’s status as a public employer took it out of the coverage of the LMRA, and that California’s alleged adoption of “principles of federal labor law” did not suffice to confer federal question jurisdiction on the District Court.  Thus, the County lacked a basis for its removal.

IUOE v. County of Plumas, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 2009)