Alaska Employment Law

Alaska statutory revisions:  The Alaska House of Representatives has passed CSHB 152, which makes various grammatical and stylistic changes in the Alaska Statutes, including replacing “which” with “that” at the head of restrictive (aka “defining”) clauses, and “must” with “shall.”  H/T: Dermot Cole at the Fairbanks Daily News-Miner.  

These changes were requested by the Legislative Council.   Under AS 01.05.036, the Legislative Affairs Agency periodically recommends to the Legislative Council substantive changes that may be enacted by the Legislature. 

Non-substantive changes to statutes (i.e., less important than changing “which” to “that”) may be performed, without legislative approval, by the Revisor of Statutes, who’s empowered by AS 01.05.031(b) to “edit and revise the laws . . . without changing the meaning of any law . . ..” 

Cat’s Paw:  The cat’s paw doctrine is familiar to employment lawyers. Gregory Fisher has reviewed it here several times.  In a recent opinion, Judge Terence Evans from the 7th Circuit explains the origins of the phrase:

One would guess that the chances are pretty slim that the work of a 17th century French poet would find its way into a Chicago courtroom in 2009.  But that’s the situation in this case as we try to make sense out of what has been dubbed the “cat’s paw” theory. The term derives from the fable “The Monkey and the Cat” penned by Jean de La Fontaine (1621-1695). In the tale, a clever - and rather unscrupulous —monkey persuades an unsuspecting feline to snatch chestnuts from a fire. The cat burns her paw in the process while the monkey profits, gulping down the chestnuts one by one. As understood today, a cat’s paw is a “tool” or “one used by another to accomplish his purposes.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1976).

Staub v. Proctor Hospital, ___ F.3d ___ (7th Cir. Mar. 25, 2009)

Note: The 7th Circuit’s opinion is notable for substantive reasons, as well: The court’s understanding of the cat’s paw doctrine is quite narrow - i.e., rarely favorable to an employee.  Moreover, the court fashions a new gate-keeping function for the trial court.  And, the court expresses a preference for jury instructions using fact-based rather than generic terms (e.g., “J. Doe,” rather than “the plaintiff” or “the employee”).